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Resumen 
 Hace tiempo que el viejo continente no ostenta la codiciada hegemonía mundial, 
esa que ahora se disputan entre Estados Unidos y China. La lucha entre ambos países por 
conseguirla ha desencadenado una serie de ataques a través de medidas proteccionistas 
en los que el resto de países del mundo se han visto involucrados. El actual contexto 
internacional se encuentra altamente globalizado, y se ha visto reflejado a través del 
incremento del comercio internacional. Así pues, debido al elevado grado de 
interdependencia que presentan las principales potencias económicas mundiales entre 
ellas, el estudio de las repercusiones de los diversos conflictos comerciales suscita 
especial interés.  
En el presente trabajo se analizan las consecuencias y el impacto económico de la 
guerra comercial entre Estados Unidos y China en la Unión Europea y en el caso 
específico de España. Las repercusiones en la Unión Europea como consecuencia de los 
aranceles impuestos a las importaciones estadounidenses de acero y aluminio resultan 
marginales, mientras que el foco del impacto se traslada a los aranceles implementados 
como resultado de la resolución de la Organización Mundial del Comercio por la disputa 
entre las empresas aeronáuticas Boeing y Airbus, siendo éste especialmente negativo para 
el sector agrario español. Las sucesivas amenazas proteccionistas de la Administración 
de Trump hacia el sector automovilístico son especialmente alarmantes, por lo que el rol 
de la Comisión Europea será crucial para evadir el impacto o, de no ser posible, 
minimizarlo. 
 
Palabras clave: acero – aluminio – aranceles – automóviles – China – comercio  
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The old continent has not held the world hegemony for a long time, which is now 
disputed among the United States and China. The fight between both countries to achieve 
it has triggered several attacks through protectionist measures, in which the rest of the 
countries of the world have become involved. The current international context is highly 
globalized, as reflected in the increase of international trade. Hence, due to the high 
degree of interdependence that the world main economic giants present among them, the 
analysis of the repercussions of trade conflicts in the rest of economies is of great interest. 
This paper analyses the consequences and economic impact of the trade war 
between the United States and China on the European Union and on the specific case of 
Spain. The repercussions on the European Union of the tariffs levied on U.S. steel and 
aluminium imports is marginal, while the focus of the impact is moved to those tariffs 
implemented as a result of the World Trade Organization resolution because of the dispute 
between the aircraft companies Boeing and Airbus, being these implications specially 
negative for the Spanish agro-food sector. The successive protectionist threats of Trump 
Administration extended to the automobile sector are particularly alarming so the role of 
the European Commission will be crucial to avoid the effect, or if not possible, mitigate 
it. 
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The topic choice of my Degree Final Dissertation is motivated by my own interest 
in international trade and the need of understanding its functioning. The Degree in 
Business Administration and Management has offered me a completely different 
perspective on the importance of international trade, and hence, my motivation to analyse 
a current issue of great relevance like the trade war between the United States and China.  
It is incredibly shocking the way world economies are interconnected among them 
in an increasingly globalized world, and how a conflict of this kind can affect in so many 
ways undermining world economic growth and stability. Therefore, I consider the topic 
to be of great concern not only for the fact of being a current topic, as I explained, but 
also because of the economic interest of an analysis of the consequences of the trade war 
on the European Union and on the specific case of Spain might have. 
Several objectives are aimed to be achieved in this dissertation. The main one is 
to give an answer to the question of how the trade war between the United States and 
China impacts on the European Union and Spain. To accomplish this goal it is required 
to present the results in a consistent and truthful way through the search and collection of 
accurate data from official databases.  
For the development of this Degree Final Dissertation, it is necessary to know the 
historic trade background of the United States in order to be able to understand why the 
conflict was originated. The American country has been characterised by a strong 
protectionist trade policy since its origins although some relevant changes were made 
towards free trade at the beginning of the 20th century. Trade relations with China have 
also been difficult and the tension escalated when China started to become an economic 
giant. A more protectionist approach returned to trade policy since the beginning of 
Donald Trump mandate.   
From that moment onwards, the measures taken by the U.S. Government have 
made the rest of the economies to remain alert due to the great impact of their decisions, 
as it is analysed on this paper. 
The trade war between the United States and China grabbed the headlines of 
international reports and the media for months owing to its relevance. The development 
of the conflict between both countries with the future involvement of the EU, alerted all 
economic blocs in the effort to quantify the effects on them. 
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To develop the topic and accomplish the objectives set, this dissertation is 
structured in six sections. The first one corresponds to this presentation of the topic. The 
second focuses on the historic context of international trade in recent years. This part 
covers the trade policy of the United States since the 20th century until the arrival to power 
of the Trump’s Administration in 2017. Also, it deals with the relationship between China 
and the United States to understand how both countries have ended in a trade war; in 
addition to the development of the conflict itself. The beginning of the conflict together 
with the U.S. tariffs established and retaliatory measures taken by China are detailed in 
this section. European international commerce before Trump is also explained in order to 
offer some background with regard to the European Union and its trade relations with 
third countries. Therefore, an emphasis is made on trade agreements and on the evolution 
of European exports and imports. 
The third section is one of the key sections of this paper as it contains the analysis 
of the economic impact on the European Union and Spain. This section is divided into 
five main sub-sections in order to clarify its understanding. The first one deals with the 
consequences of the trade war on the European Union, while the second one examines if 
the European Union is the new target of the U.S. protectionist policy through the example 
of the dispute between Boeing and Airbus. The third sub-section focuses on the retaliation 
measures taken by the European Union to mitigate the effect of the tariffs imposed by the 
United States. In the fourth sub-section the focus is shifted to Spain, here, the impact of 
steel and aluminium tariffs together with those tariffs established as a result of the World 
Trade Organization resolution is studied. In addition, the hypothetical economic impact 
on the Spanish automobile sector in case the threat towards this sector takes place is also 
analysed. The last sub-section deals with the impact of the trade conflicts on financial 
markets. 
The following section covers the main conclusions and limitations drawn from the 
analysis. It also explains whether the previously mentioned objectives have been 
accomplished or not. As it is a current topic, one limitation of this dissertation to be 
considered is the time horizon, which reaches until 2019. In consequence, some of the 
effects and consequences cannot be quantified yet.  
Finally, the two last sections correspond to the bibliography, in which all the 
resources and references used for the elaboration of this dissertation can be found; and 
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the appendixes, with the extended information in each of the sections because of the 
interest and motivation of all the aspects for the comprehension of the paper.  
 
2. HISTORIC CONTEXT. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RECENT YEARS. 
2.1. TRADE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The trade policy of the United States has been characterised by a strong 
protectionism since its founding. Back to the 20th century, the Smoot-Hawley Act (1930) 
resulted in the implementation of high barriers and unilateral tariffs aimed at mitigating 
the effects of the Great Depression, which in turn, exacerbated the Great Depression as it 
was later demonstrated.1 
The Reciprocal Tariff Act (1934) implied a turning point in the U.S. trade policy. 
The country started to reduce tariffs and gave President Roosevelt the authority to 
negotiate bilateral agreements with other countries. 
                   There was a need for such an act for two reasons. First, the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act of 1930 raised duties on imports to 53 percent in 1931 and 59 percent in 1932. 
This action provoked other countries to retaliate against the U.S., shrinking world trade. 
Second, the ensuing worldwide contraction in economic activity in the early 1930s caused 
world trade to decline even further (Canto, 1983, page 680). 
In 1941, the Atlantic Charter between the United Kingdom and the United States 
helped to avoid the “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies that came after World War I and that 
are said to be the outbreak of World War II. 
After World War II, trade policy shifted towards a multilateral approach 
encouraged by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947). This 
agreement was set under the principles of non-discrimination, reciprocity, open trade and 
fair competition. Successive negotiations and rounds took place, which were translated 
into further tariff reduction and in the regulation of non-tariff barriers.  
The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 replaced the 
GATT and was significant for the American trade policy. It helped encourage free trade.  
                                                          
1 Whaples, Robert. (1995). Where is there consensus among American Economic Historians? The results 
of a survey on Forty Propositions. The Journal of Economic History, vol.55, No.1 (Mar. 1995), pp 139-154. 
Cambridge University Press.  
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In the post-Cold War era, the United States also participated in other free trade 
agreements including the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the South Korea and US Free Trade Agreement and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
 
2.2. U.S. - CHINA RELATIONSHIP. 
The relationship between China and the United Stated has been complicated since 
the beginning due to political disagreements. An example is the sixty-year Chinese 
immigration prohibition that started in 1880. The outbreak of the Chinese Civil War 
limited relations between the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the U.S. for 
many years.  
During the Cold War, relations between the communist China and the anti-
communist US were tense. The Anti-communist hysteria, later known as “McCarthysm” 
put under suspicion all those with any kind of relation with China. In 1978, the U.S. 
Government and the PRC established full diplomatic relations. U.S. President Carter 
agreed to the terms of the “One-China policy”, which stated there was only one China, in 
spite of the claims of two governments, the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC). 
In 2001, China entered the WTO (World Trade Organization) becoming the 
second largest trade partner of the U.S. and the world’s second largest economy after the 
United States in 2010. 
The Chinese growth has resulted in increased tensions between both economies. 
“It is also the fact that Chinese military modernization is directed at constraining U.S. 
power projection capabilities in the Western Pacific, and in particular that China has made 
great strides in eroding traditional U.S. military advantages in Asia.” (Evan S. Madeiros, 
2019, p. 96). The security dilemma has become a significant dispute.  
The entrance of China in the WTO favoured the acceleration of its economic 
growth. The United States had a special interest in this entrance as more trade with China 
would have a positive impact on the American economy.  
As member of the WTO, PRC would reduce import tariffs, open its markets and 
protect copyrights. China did reduce tariffs although it did not protect copyrights and 
forced American companies to transfer technology to access the Chinese market. 
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China has been accused over the years of not complying with the international 
trade rules, like the case in which the WTO ruled against China in 2008 for violating 
global trade rules by requiring automakers operating there to buy most components from 
local suppliers or face higher tariffs.2 
All of the abovementioned negatively impacted on the U.S. trade with China. 
Tensions between both economies intensified as U.S. trade deficit with China increased.  
Since the incorporation of China to the World Trade Organization, the American trade 
deficit with China substantially rose, it almost doubled from 2001 to 2005.  
The Obama Administration took active measures to reduce the trade imbalance by 
filing numerous enforcement complaints against China at the WTO. Moreover, Obama 
increased import tariffs on Chinese tires as an anti-dumping measure in 2009 
contradicting, in this way, the statements of not rising tariffs above the current levels at 
that time and avoiding protectionist measures. This tariff implied a 35% rise over the 
product value during the first year, declining to a 30% over the second year and falling to 
a 25% during the third year.3 
Nevertheless, trade policy took a more protectionist perspective with the arrival 
of Trump to Presidency in March 2017. The importance already given during his election 
campaign to protectionism and to the reduction of trade deficit has resulted in the ongoing 
trade war with China.  
 
2.3. BEGINNING OF THE ONGOING TRADE WAR. 
The trade war started in March 2018 with the announcement of Trump’s 
Administration of the implementation of import tariffs on steel and aluminium although 
tariffs on imports of solar panels and washing machines had already been imposed a few 
months ago, in January. 
This announcement is the result of the investigation carried out by the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 in 2017 which states 
                                                          
2 Drajem, Mark. (2008, July 19). WTO Challenges China on Tariffs. Bloomberg News. Washington Post. 
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/07/18/AR2008071802945.html [Accessed on February 10th, 2020]. 
3 Loven, Jennifer. (2009, December 12). Obama imposes tariffs on Chinese tires. AP Associated Press. 
NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/32808731/ns/business-
world_business/t/obama-imposes-tariffs-chinese-tires/#.XvMeJij7TIU [Accessed on February 10th, 2020]. 
10 
 
that “the acts, policies, and practices of the Government of China related to technology 
transfer, intellectual property, and innovation covered in the investigation are 
unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.”4 Therefore, 
Trump sets three different lines of actions: implementation of tariffs, WTO dispute to 
address China’s discriminatory technology licensing practices and investment 
restrictions.  According to President Trump, the technology transfer and intellectual 
property policies of China respond to its intention to achieve economic leadership in 
advanced technology as described in “Made in China 2025”. 5 
As already stated before, the U.S. Government established import tariffs on steel 
and aluminium of 25% and 10%, respectively, as a response to Chinese theft of 
intellectual property and technology. In consonance with the report of the Trade 
Department, both steel and aluminium imports were a threat for the Homeland Security 
of the United States. 
As part of the line of action of the U.S. Government, the United States Trade 
Representative launched a new WTO challenge against China in March 2018, too. The 
request is aimed, according to the United States, to address the Chinese unfair practices 
in which the Chinese Government denies U.S. companies, basic patent rights to prevent 
a Chinese company from using the technology. 
On the other hand, China imposed tariffs on April 1st, to 128 U.S. products as 
retaliation to the duties levied on steel and aluminium. Products like fruits, nuts and wine 
were affected by a 15% tariff while soybeans, pork and other related products were 
imposed a 25% tariff. 
Two days later, the USTR released a proposed tariff list on more than 1300 
Chinese products with a value of 50 billion dollars.  The sectors subjected to tariffs were 
the following: aerospace, information technology, robotics, medical devices and 
machinery. 
                                                          
4Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2018). Notice of Determination and Request for Public 
Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies 
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. Docket No. USTR-
2018-0005. 
5 “Made in China 2025” is the strategy announced by the Chinese Government in May 2015 to boost and 
restructure its industry so that China becomes the international leader in technology. It is the first step of 
a thirty-year plan which consists of three stages: reduce the gap with other countries (2025), strengthen 
its competitive position (2035) and finally, lead in innovation (2045). 
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In May, Liu He, economic advisor of China and General Secretary Xi Jinping 
visited Washington for trade talks. China agreed to the U.S. demand to significantly 
reduce U.S. trade deficit with China by substantially increasing exports and therefore, 
both economies put the trade war on hold, as announced by the U.S. Treasury Secretary, 
Steven Mnunchin. 
Nevertheless, Trump’s Administration published the final list of the tariffs 
proposed on April 3rd after revising some exceptions submitted by interested persons. 6 
As stated in the press release, this list consisted of two sets of U.S. tariff lines. The first 
one includes 818 lines of the original 1,333 lines and covers approximately $34 billion 
worth of imports. This first set came into effect on July 6th. Goods in the industrial and 
transport sectors, as well as medical devices and television experienced a rise of 25% 
import tax. The second set of tariffs on $16 billion of Chinese products were later 
announced to begin on August 23rd.  
In retaliation, China targeted goods such as seafood, beef and soybeans, for a total 
value of 34 billion dollars, too. China accuses U.S. of starting the trade war. 
The U. S. Government considered additional tariffs of $200 billion worth at a rate 
of 10% in response to the Chinese harm to workers, farmer and businesses. In addition, 
Trump asked Trade Representative, Robert Lighthizer to consider the increase up to 25%. 
This duty subjected the proposed list of products announced on July 10th. 
As a consequence, China threatened to impose additional tariffs on U.S. products 
worth $60 billion annually as the trade war between both economies intensified. 
Moreover, China filed a complaint at the WTO because of the duties imposed on solar 
panels by the U.S. 
In August, Under Secretary of Treasury, David Malpass and China Vice-minister 
of Commerce Wang Shouwen met in Washington D.C to reopen negotiations. 
Meanwhile, the already announced tariffs on $16 billion on Chinese products took effect. 
As response, China initiates another WTO dispute complaint against the additional U.S. 
tariffs on Chinese imports.  
                                                          
6 United States. Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2018). Notice of Determination and 
Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: 
China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. 




One month later, in September, the duties on $200 billion on Chinese imports 
already announced in August started to be effective. Initially, at a level of 10% rising up 
to 25% on January 1st, 2019. In addition, Trump threatened duties on $267 billion more 
if China retaliated. 
In December 2018, China and the U.S. agreed to suspend new trade tariffs for 90 
days to allow negotiations. China promised to buy a significant amount of agricultural, 
industrial and energy products and both economies agreed to open their markets. 
However, according to the White House, “If at the end of this period of time, the parties 
are unable to reach an agreement, the 10 percent tariffs will be raised to 25 percent”. This 
increment took place at the end of the truce period. 
The conflict escalated when in the same month, Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) of Huawei was arrested in Canada at the request of the U.S. Government. 
Huawei and Meng were charged with bank and wire fraud in relation to skirting American 
sanctions on Iran.  
In March 2019, Huawei sued the United States for banning U.S. agencies for from 
using Huawei’s equipment. The Trump Administration launches an aggressive campaign 
warning other countries not to use Huawei equipment in order to develop 5G networks 
(see Appendix I). 
In May, the trade war intensifies and Trump executed the promised rise in tariffs 
from 10 to 25% on $200 billion worth of Chinese products which was meant to be 
implemented in January.  As retaliation, China announced plans to increase tariffs on $60 
billion worth of American goods. The Trump Administration also banned US companies 
to use foreign-made telecommunications equipment and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce added Huawei to its foreign entity blacklist. 
Some months later, in August, the United States accused China of manipulating 
its currency, more specifically, of devaluating the yuan. This occurs one week after the 
U.S. announced higher tariffs on $300 billion worth goods, which finally went into effect 
on September 1st. 
During the same month, the USTR, instructed by President Trump, implemented 
an increase by 5% the tariffs on $550 billion worth of Chinese imports. Moreover, for the 
25% tariffs on $250 billion worth of products, the USTR will increase the rate to 30%, 
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which went into effect on October 1st. Finally, for the 10% tariffs on $300 billion worth 
Chinese goods, the rate will rise to 15%.  
Finally, in January 2020, the United States and China signed “Phase One” Trade 
Agreement. An enforceable and historic deal that addresses issues regarding Intellectual 
Property, Technology Transfer, Agriculture, Expanding Trade and Financial Services. As 
a result, China has committed to make significant purchases of U.S. goods and services 
for the next years while Trump has agreed to ease up U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports.  
A few days before signing the agreement, the United States dropped the 
accusation of currency manipulator. 
 
2.4. EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL TRADE BEFORE TRUMP. 
The European Economic Community (EEC) created by the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 was aimed at economically integrate its member states. Some years later, the 
enforcement of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 renamed the EEC to European 
Community (EC). 7 
 
2.4.1. Trade agreements. 
The trade agreements of the European Union (EU) are guided by the principles of 
the World Trade Organization. Since its origins, the EU opted for free trade and open 
markets within its member states, which implied eliminating trade barriers. Eventually, 
the European Union extended its commercial relations to third countries through new 
trade agreements.  
Trade agreements differ in content and can be classified as following: 
 Economic Association Agreements (EEA): support the development of trade 
partners from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
 Free Trade Agreements (FTA): they allow a reciprocal market opening with 
developed and emerging economies. 
                                                          
7 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Maastricht Treaty in 1993 is one of the founding treaties of the 
European Union. The Treaty amended the first pillar of the European Union: European Communities, and 




 Association Agreements (AA): Reinforce wider political agreements. 
The European Union has numerous trade partners, including the United States, 
Canada, Mexico, Chile, Cuba, CARIFORUM, Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama), Bolivia, Colombia, Equator, Peru, 
MERCOSUR, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and some countries of West 
Europe (Albany, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, 
Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), small states such as 
Vatican, Monaco and San Marino. 
Moreover, among its trade partners some Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, etc), Asian countries (China, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, among others) and finally, 
countries from Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea) can be 
found. 
The increasing relations among its trade partners are reflected in the numerous 
agreements in place and under negotiation. However, only some of the most relevant ones 
before the “Trump era” are going to be mentioned. 
The United States and the European Union have the largest bilateral trade and 
investment relationship favoured by their belonging to the WTO. Some of the most 
important trade agreements are the following: 
 Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the European Union and the United 
States of America (1999). It was aimed to foster trade of goods between the two 
economic blocs by eliminating technical barriers. 8 
 Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in 2007. It is a high level economic forum 
to discuss in a coherent and coordinated manner with the goal of creating closer 
ties between the U.S. and the UE. Three advisory groups were set up: the 
Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue and the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue.  
The trade relations between the EU and Canada have their origins in the historic bonds 
that connected both economies during colonialism. The similarity between European and 
                                                          
8 Regulation implemented by States that must be complied with by imported products in order to be 




Canadian cultures and with English and French, European languages, being Canada’s 
official languages, have foster economic agreements. Some of the most significant ones 
are the following: 
 Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation between the 
European Communities and Canada. (1976). It has served as a base for further 
bilateral trade relations. 
 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (2009) entered into 
force provisionally in 2017. Its objective is to reduce tariffs and ease the export of 
goods and services. 
As mentioned before, several countries of Latin America are trading partners of the 
EU and, therefore, have signed different agreements: 
 Inter-regional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and MERCOSUR (1999). It set the basis for further negotiations and 
laid the foundations for an International Association between them. It was signed 
by the founders of MECOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and 
the European Community. 
 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement or 
Global Agreement between the European Union and Mexico (2000). It deals with 
political dialogue, trade relations and cooperation. This agreement was replaced 
in April 2018 as both parties reached an agreement in principle on the trade part 
of the Global Agreement. 
The Asian bloc is also a relevant partner of the EU. More precisely, China is the EU’s 
second biggest trading partner behind the U.S. as a result of the intensified efforts on trade 
relations. Nonetheless, the EU has filed complaints against China for unfair trade. 
 Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (1985). It laid the foundations for 
further agreements.  
 Agreement on Maritime Transport (2002). 
 New strategy on China (2016). The strategy encourages reciprocity, a level 
playing field and fair competition. It also includes negotiations on a 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. 
 EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (2020). It puts an Investment 
Agreement as centre of the EU’s long-term bilateral relations with China. 
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Moreover, within the Asian bloc, trade relations among Japan and the European 
Union took a significant step forward in 2018 with the creation of these new trade 
agreements: 
 Economic Association Agreement EU-Japan (2018). It was a turning point for the 
relations with the Asian country. This EAA eases export for European companies 
as it eliminates the majority of import tariffs on European products including dairy 
products, wine, alcohol and textile. 
 Association Agreement EU-Japan (2018). It was aimed at extending its scope 
towards other sectors such as the energy sector, education, research and climate 
change, among others.  
 
2.4.2. Imports and exports. 
Extra EU-28 trade significantly evolved from 2004 to 2017 (see graph 2.4.2.1), 
year in which Donald Trump won the presidential elections of the United States. EU 
imports experienced a steady increase at a higher rate than exports. As a result, trade 
balance was negative during several years, reaching the biggest deficit (276,280.8 million 
euros) in 2008, coinciding with the financial crisis. However, the negative trend reversed 
in 2013, when the balance had a surplus of 49,478.3 million euros. Since then, the balance 
has been positive, although it dropped by 51% in 2017. 
 
Graph 2.4.2.1: Evolution of Extra UE-28 Trade, 2004-2017. 
 







2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EVOLUTION OF EXTRA  UE-28 TRADE, 2004-
2017 (in million EUR).
Trade balance Exports Imports
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As already stated, trade has evolved with both intra-group and extra-group 
countries over the years. Focusing on the extra-group countries, the main EU-28 trading 
partners, according to Eurostat, are: United States, Switzerland, China, Turkey, Japan, 
Norway and Russia. 
The United States was, and still is in 2019, the EU’s major trading partner in 
exports (see graph 2.4.2.2.). The share significantly decrease until 16.70% in 2013, rising 
again until 20% in 2017. Despite the fact that its share dropped by 19.68% from 2004 to 
2017, the U.S. was by far the main partner in exports. 
The share of China grew from 5.10% to 10.5% between 2004 and 2017. Regarding 
the rest of the countries, their shares slightly decreased during the period with the 
exception of Turkey, which rose by 4.65% and Switzerland, which remained stable. (See 
Appendix II). 
 
Graph 2.4.2.2: Shares of EU-28 exports of goods for main partners, 2004-2017. 
 
Source: Own source from Eurostat data. 
 
Regarding imports, the share of China (see Appendix III) grew from 12.60% to 
20.20% between 2004 and 2017 (see graph 2.4.2.3.). It implies a 60.32% increase in its 
share, which makes China the first EU-28 importer. The EU negative sign of the trade 
balance with China has remained along all these years as a result of the high number of 
imports and the smaller amount of exports. The deficit varied from 80,820.7 million euros 







2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
In
 %
SHARES OF EU-28 EXPORTS OF GOODS FOR MAIN 
PARTNERS, 2004-2017.
U.S CHINA SWITZERLAND NORWAY TURKEY JAPAN RUSSIA
18 
 
The U.S. is the second main importer of the European Union, with a share of 
13.90% in 2017. It fell by 10.32% between 2004 and 2017, which made the country lose 
the first position as EU importer.  
Japan experienced a steady decrease of imports of 49.32% between 2004 and 
2017. The EU trade balance with the Asian country also remained negative over the 
mentioned period of time. However, the deficit declined from 31,451.4 million euros to 
7,925.8 million euros (see Appendix V). 
On the contrary, the share of imports of Turkey rose from 3.20% to 3.80%. 
Imports in 2017 were 69,775.6 million euros while they amounted to 32,862.7 million 
euros in 2004. In relation with the trade balance, EU had a surplus of 7,322.5 million 
euros and 15,019.2 million euros in 2004 and 2017, respectively. (See Appendix V). 
The rest of the countries suffered a slight decrease in their share of imports of goods. 
Graph 2.4.2.3: Shares of EU-28 imports of goods for main partners, 2004-2017. 
 
Source: Own source from Eurostat data. 
 
International trade has considerably increased over years, which implies higher 
exports and higher amount of imports. For the period of time between 2004 and 2017, the 
EU has had trade surplus with the U.S., Switzerland and Turkey whereas it has had deficit 
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3. ANALYSIS.  
3.1. IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR ON THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
Results show that the ongoing trade conflict between the United States and China 
indirect and directly affects the European Union. There are many reasons and sources of 
impact which are going to be detailed hereunder. 
First, it is important to highlight the high degree of dependence of the EU on 
international trade. The World Bank database shows EU exports of goods and services 
represented the 44.8% of its GDP whereas exports only accounted for 12.2% of U.S. GDP 
and a 19.5% in the case of China in 2018. This explains why global trade tensions 
undermine the EU trade and stability. 
Secondly, the 10% tariffs on aluminium imports and 25% on steel imports 
imposed by the U.S. Government in March 2018, temporarily exempted the European 
Union. However, on June 1st, 2018 they came into effect, directly impacting EU exports. 
These protectionist measures are estimated to damage the European Union economy in 
6,400 million euros. Nevertheless, it has a limited impact as the significance of UE-28 
exports of steel and aluminium is 2.76% of the total exports to the U.S. in 2019, 0.5 
percentage points lower than the previous years. 9 
In addition, the U.S. – China tariff war affects the value chain although the impact 
on the EU is very small due to the low EU value added to Chinese exports to the U.S., 
which according to an analytical article published by the Bank of Spain, it accounts only 
for less than 0.1% of its GDP.10 
On the contrary, the impact of tariffs on value chains has been positive rather than 
negative. The North American and Asian suppliers are the most affected by the measures 
due to a loss in its competitiveness while the European Union is estimated to capture 
around $90 billion of trade related to value chains. 11 
                                                          
9 The significance of 2.76% of UE-28 exports of steel and aluminium to the United States over total exports 
to the U.S. has been calculated with data obtained from EUROSTAT and considering iron and steel, articles 
of iron or steel, aluminium and articles thereof. EUROSTAT does not offer a breakdown of steel and 
aluminium only, so the significance of these two products is much lower than 2.76%.  
10 Viani, Francesca. (2019). Las recientes tendencias proteccionistas en el ámbito comercial y su impacto 
sobre la Unión Europea. Boletín Económico 2/2019. Artículos analíticos. ISSN 0210-3737. 
11 Nicita, Alessando (2018). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Key 





Regarding annual economic growth (see graph 3.1.1.), the world rate has 
experienced a slowdown, declining to a 2.4% in 2019 from the 3% of 2018 as a result of 
trade tensions and a deceleration of domestic investment. However, it is expected to 
recover again during the following years with prospects of 2.5% for 2020 and 2.6% for 
2021, according to World Bank data.12 
In the case of the European Union, trade tensions contributed to the decrease by 
0.5 percentage points reaching a 1.5% growth in 2019 in comparison to 2018. Chinese 
annual real GDP growth declined to 6.1% in 2019 from 6.6% in the previous year. The 
U.S. suffered a slightly higher economic regression due to the drop to 2.3%, 0.6 
percentage points lower than in 2018. 
 
Graph 3.1.1: Annual percentage GDP growth rate, 2010-2019. 
 
Source: Own source from World Bank and Eurostat data. 
 
Moreover, this tariff war indirectly impacts in the European economy by means 
of the increased uncertainty together with the loss of the investors’ confidence and the 
adverse and unpredictable behaviour of the financial markets.   
 
                                                          
12 Economic prospects made by the World Bank does not take into consideration the current and ongoing 
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3.2. IS THE EUROPEAN UNION THE NEW TARGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES? 
The Trump Administration not only targeted the EU with the establishment of 
tariffs on steel and aluminium imports in March 2018, which came into effect some 
months later, but also threatened the economic bloc with the imposition of 25% tariffs on 
automobile imports. The announcement was made as a result of the U.S. investigation 
under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 in which automobiles, among 
other products, are classified as a national threat to the United States. 
The U.S. will charge these tariffs in case the European Union and the United States 
do not reach an agreement. Such agreement consists of the achievement of bilateral free 
trade in industrial products (with the exception of automobiles), increase of chemical and 
pharmaceutical trade, reduction of technical barriers and strengthen cooperation in the 
energy field, among others. 
If these trade barriers are finally implemented, the EU economy would be highly 
undermined due to the great significance automobile exports to the U.S. has over the total 
automobile exports (see graph 3.2.1.). According to Eurostat, the U.S. itself accounted 
for 30.15% of the total Extra EU-28 automobile exports in 2019, followed by China 
(17.42%). As proved, the United States is the first automobile exporter for the European 
Union and, the imposition of 25% tariffs on imports would damage the economy to such 
an extent that even the American automobile sector has taken a stand against the tariffs.  
 
Graph 3.2.1: Share of Extra EU-28 automobile exports by partner (2019). 
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3.2.1. Boeing – Airbus dispute. 
Apart from the ongoing trade war that affects the EU and the threats from the 
Trump Administration to levy tariffs, there is another dispute between both economic 
giants as a result of two aircraft companies: Airbus and Boeing.  
The conflict dates back to 2004, when the American company Boeing insisted on 
the U.S. Government to withdraw from the 1992 Agreement and to file a complaint at the 
WTO over the EU subsidies granted to the company. Boeing claimed that Airbus would 
not be its major rival if the EU had not offered economic support to the aircraft company. 
Consequently, the EU filed another complaint at the WTO accusing the U.S. of 
granting illegal subsidies to Boeing, more specifically, the EU claimed that the U.S. 
company has received around 20,000 million dollars since 1992 and continued receiving 
23,000 million dollars annually. 
In 2019, the WTO ruled in favour on the U.S. allowing the country to levy tariffs 
imports from the EU for a value of 6,900 million euros. The U.S. is allowed to apply a 
100% tariff on the affected products and started implementing a 10% on large civil 
aircraft, which was increased to 15% in March 2020; and a 25% on the rest of products.  
The list of products targeted by the U.S. Government includes Spanish olive oil, 
Scottish whiskey, French wine, Italian cheese and German cookies, among others. 13 
These new tariffs harms the global aircraft industry as a significant percentage of 
Airbus purchases related to airplanes comes from American suppliers, therefore, its 
supply chain and thousands of job positions are affected. In addition, European and global 
consumers are affected by an increase in the price. 
Regarding the tariffs imposed to food, some countries of the European Union are 
more damaged than others, for example, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy as they are 
some of the biggest exporters. Spain is also harmed due to the tariffs levied on olive oil, 
cheese and wine.  
 
                                                          
13 United States. Federal Register. (2019, October 9). Notice of Determination and Action Pursuant to 
Section 301- Large Civil Aircraft Dispute. Vol. 84, No 196.   
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3.3. EU RETALIATION TO U.S. MEASURES. 
The European Commission tried to permanently exempt the EU from the steel and 
aluminium import tariffs but due to its failure, it reacted to the above-mentioned 
establishment of tariffs to steel and aluminium imports by adopting rebalancing measures 
in line with the WTO. This way, the EU levied imports from the U.S. of 6,400 million 
euros worth, value estimated as damaged caused by the U.S. tariffs.  
The EU tariffs will follow two phases: the first one, already implemented on June 
2018, affects U.S. imports of 2,800 million euros worth; while the second one will be 
implemented within three years.  The European Commission published a list of targeted 
goods including agricultural, steel and aluminium products.14 These duties will be 
effective until the U.S. removes theirs.  
Moreover, the EU together with some other WTO member like China, Canada, 
Mexico, Norway and Russia, filed a complaint at the WTO over the tariffs on steel and 
aluminium imports. 
Thus, the European Union is waiting for the WTO dispute settlement which is 
expected to take place during the spring of 2020. After the settlement, the EU will 
implement the remaining 3,600 million euros worth rebalancing measures.  
Meanwhile, Trump and Juncker, former EC President, met in July 25th, 2018 to 
reach an agreement that allowed to start negotiation. Since then, both economic giants 
have been negotiating a trade deal. If no trade deal is reached, the U.S. threatened to 
establish duties on automobile imports. Nevertheless, the European Commission does not 
expect these tariffs to be imposed as the time period to implement them expired although 
no formal answer has been provided to the European Union.   
 
 
                                                          
14 World Trade Organization. (2018, 18 May). Council for Trade in Goods Committee on Safeguards. 
Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 Of The Agreement On Safeguards To The Council For Trade In 
Goods Of Proposed Suspension Of Concessions And Other Obligations Referred To In Paragraph 2 Of 
Article 8 Of The Agreement On Safeguards. Retrieved from 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/may/tradoc_156909.pdf [Accessed on April 3rd, 2020]. 
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3.4. ECONOMIC IMPACT ON SPAIN. 
Spain, as member state of the European Union, is also affected by the trade 
conflict between the United States and China and by the direct disputes with the U.S. 
These conflicts, together with the uncertainty scenario caused by the Brexit and 
the Spanish political instability have contributed to the slowdown of the Spanish 
economic growth. According to the National Statistics Institute and to the Bank of Spain, 
GDP growth rate decreased from 2.4% in 2018 to 2% in 2019, and reduced their 
projections for 2020 to 1.7%. As stated in a report of the Bank of Spain, the economic 
slowdown is due to the decreasing of both internal and external demand.15 The lower 
contribution of external demand to GDP is caused by a substantial increase of imports at 
the expense of exports.  
Spain, like the EU, is highly dependent on foreign trade, both for imports and for 
exports. In line with the contribution of the Bank of Spain, trade balance has been negative 
over the past five years as a result of a higher volume of imports than exports (see 
Appendix VI). According to Eurostat, exports of goods and services accounted for 34.9% 
of Spain’s GDP in 2019, 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points lower in comparison to 2017 and 
2018, respectively. It is important to highlight that not only have these events directly 
affected export companies but also producers and suppliers of raw materials together with 
production lines. 
Graph 3.4.1. represents the share of the top 10 countries of destination for Spanish 
exports. Among these exports, exports to European countries like France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium accounted for 54.42% over total exports in 2019 
(ICEX database).16 Therefore, as exports to European countries represents a significant 
share, damages in the rest of European countries will have an impact on the Spanish 




                                                          
15 Bank of Spain.  (2019). Macroeconomic Projections for the Spanish Economy (2019-2022): the Banco 
de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2019 joint forecasting exercise. 
16 All organized and handled data from this analysis can be provided in a request to the author. They are 
not all included in the appendices of this paper due to its length. 
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Graph 3.4.1: Top 10 countries of destination for Spanish exports (2019). 
  
Source: Own source from data obtained from ICEX. 
 
It can also be observed that the Unites States was the sixth country of destination 
for Spanish exports, which amounted to 4.74% over total exports in 2019. Exports to this 
country has experienced an increasing trend over the past four years, more precisely, they 
rose by 20.82% in spite of the tariffs implemented by the U.S. 
The ranking of the most exported products is industrial and technological 
products, followed by agro-food products, consumption goods and beverages. With 
regards to the United States, agro-food products are the third most exported category 
instead of being the second one, as it was the case in the overall of exports.  Graph 3.4.2. 
shows the percentage of exports to the U.S. of each category of products over the total 
volume of exports to the U.S. It can be observed that industrial and technological products 
accounted for a 73.89%, consumption goods, an 11.77%, while agro-food products 
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Graph 3.4.2: Share of products exported to the U.S (2019). 
 
Source: Own source from ICEX database. 
 
3.4.1. Impact of steel and aluminium tariffs. 
The 10% tariffs on U.S. aluminium imports and 25% on U.S. steel imports 
temporarily exempted the European Union and, consequently, Spain. However, these 
duties came into effect some months later in the EU.  
Steel and aluminium exports to the U.S. accounted for 2.47% of total exports to 
such country in 2019, which is a small share with respect to exports to other countries.17 
The evolution of the exports of these goods shows that they slightly decreased by 0.92% 
in 2018 in comparison to the previous year although they recovered during the following 
year with an increase of 4.81% with regards to 2018. This data demonstrates that the 
impact on steel and aluminium exports has been marginal rather than significant.  
Nevertheless, the impact of tariffs levied on steel and aluminium imports was 
estimated in 400 million euros per year, as reported by business associations belonging 
to both sectors. President of UNESID (business association of the steel industry) stated 
in a press conference their concern about the tariffs, not much for the direct impact but 
for the potential increase of imports from third countries as a result of the American trade 
                                                          
17 Steel and aluminium data has been obtained from ICEX database and considers cast steel products, 
carbon steel products, stainless steel products, alloy steel products, cast aluminium products and semi-
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restrictions.18 The European Union and by extension, Spain, being the destination of steel 
and aluminium products that cannot be sold in the American market would result in a 
price reduction. Therefore, UNESID claimed safeguard duties to the European 
Commission, which became effective, as explained in the analysis of the European Union. 
In fact, according to UNESID steel imports increased from 2017 to 2018 by 
13.4%, and more specifically, EU-28 imports rose by 7.1% while imports from third 
countries rose by 29% (see Appendix VII).  
The overall impact of these tariffs on Spain has not been very relevant although 
they are more important at a sectoral level.  
 
3.4.2. Impact of tariffs resulting from WTO resolution. 
Apart from the tariffs on steel and aluminium imports originated from the trade 
war between the United States and China, Spain has also been affected by the WTO 
resolution of the already mentioned Boeing-Airbus dispute whereby the United States 
was allowed to implement new tariffs on a wide list of products including large civil 
aircraft and agro-food products.  
Agro-food exports to the U.S. represented, according to ICEX, a 3.55% over total 
agro-food exports in 2019 while total agro-food exports accounted for 15.52% over total 
exports in that year. However, total agro-food exports only represented 3.88% over GDP 
of 2019 while agro-food products exports to the U.S accounted for 0.14% over GDP in 
2019, too. This implies that the contribution of these exports is not very elevated with 
regards to the total GDP of the Spanish economy although the consequences of these new 
duties are more serious for the Spanish agricultural sector, as it is now going to be 
clarified.   
The Bank of Spain quantified the impact in 100 million euros approximately and 
forecasted a reduction in the sales of agro-products of 12%, which is equivalent to the 
0.01% of the Spanish GDP if the weight of these products exports are taken into 
consideration in comparison with the total volume of exports to the rest of the world. 
                                                          
18 UNESID. (2018, March 22). Unesid Alerta del Peligro de una Avalancha de Importaciones de Acero, como 
consecuencia de las Medidas Proteccionistas de Estados Unidos. Press Release. Retrieved from 





Moreover, the Financial Institution states that a 1% rise of import tariffs established by 
other countries on Spanish products implies a nominal exports reduction of 0.6%. 
However, since the scope of this analysis reaches until 2019 and these duties came 
into effect in October 2019, their consequences cannot be validated yet. 
Among the agro-food products targeted with a 25% tariff by the U.S. 
Administration, the main ones affected are wine, olive oil, olives, cheese, pork, ham, 
fruits and vegetables. These products represent the 73.39%, according to ICEX, of total 
agro-food exports to the U.S. Thus, the U.S. targeted a strategic sector for the Spanish 
economy because, as said before, the United States is the main country of destination for 
Spanish exports after the European countries. With this data it can be inferred that this 
sector is the most damaged sector despite the fact that the dispute was between two 
aircraft companies. 
Graph 3.4.2.1 exhibits the share of the main targeted products with the 25% tariff 
over the total volume of agro-food and beverage exports in 2019. Olive oil and olives 
represented the 32.49% over total agro-food and beverage exports to the U.S., the highest 
share in comparison to the rest of products targeted. Wine and other beverages accounted 
for 18.43% while seafood represented the 7.94%. Meat and meat-based products (4.55%), 
cheese and other dairy products (4.40%), fruits and vegetables (5.58%) accounted for a 
lower share of agro-food and beverage exports to such country. 
 
Graph 3.4.2.1: Significance of main targeted products over agro-food and beverage 
exports (2019). 
 







SIGNIFICANCE OF MAIN TARGETED PRODUCTS 
OVER AGRO-FOOD AND BEVERAGE EXPORTS (2019).
OLIVE OIL AND OLIVES MEAT AND MEAT-BASED PRODUCTS
FRUITS AND VEGETABLES CHEESE AND REST OF DAIRY PRODUCTS




Some of the most affected products targeted by the United States are olive oil and 
olives owing to their weight in comparison to the rest of the products subject to the tariff, 
as shown above. These two products represented 6.95% of total agro-food exports and a 
13.34% of their exports to the U.S. over the total amount of olives and olive oil exports. 
Exports of these products decreased by 11.72% from 2017 to 2019, as forecasted by the 
Bank of Spain and according to ASOLIVA, the Spanish Industry and Export Trade 
Association of Olive Oil, sales reduction is estimated in 150,000 tons per year.  
It can be inferred that this is one of the most damaged sectors by the WTO 
resolution and actions taken by the U.S. due to the high impact these products have on 
the overall agro-food exports to the United States. As a consequence of these protectionist 
measures, Spanish companies were in the need to reduce prices in order to be able to sell 
these products to the U.S., resulting in lower margins and losses for firms.  
The reduction of sales has resulted in storage problems for producers and 
companies, which has been translated into even more lower prices. Another consequence 
is work destruction due to the decrease in sales. 
In addition, sales to other European countries such as Italy, for packing have not 
been included in the just mentioned figure. In consonance with ASOLIVA, the sector is 
also afraid of losing its export share in the United States owing to the 25% tariffs. 
This goes in line to what it was stated before, Spain has not only suffered the direct 
impact on U.S. import tariffs to local products, but also has been negatively influenced 
by the tariffs to the rest of the EU due to its high dependence to these countries.  
 
3.4.3. Hypothetical impact on automobile sector. 
Along this dissertation, it has already be stated that, for now, it is not likely that 
the Administration of the United States will implement the tariffs on U.S. automobile 
imports. However, as it is still a possibility and it has been done for the case of the 
European Union, the consequences of their establishment in Spain are going to be studied. 
Before analysing the duties impact on Spain, the position of the Spanish 
automobile sector is going to be evaluated.  
The main European partners for Spanish automobile exports are Germany, Italy 
and United Kingdom. There has been a similar trend in the three countries: exports 
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decreased from 2017 to 2018 according to ICEX but, they recovered and reached higher 
levels the following year, 2019. (See Appendix VIII). 
On the one hand, automobile and automobile components exports to Germany 
accounted for 19.75% of total exports of this sector while exports to the United Kingdom 
represented a 10.34%, both figures from 2019 obtained from ICEX database. Similarly, 
exports to Italy were 8.49% of total automobile exports that same year. 
On the other hand, automobile and automobile components exports to the United 
States made up the 2.59% of total automobile exports in 2019. These data implies that the 
impact caused by tariffs would be low in comparison to its impact on the EU. 
Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that the main countries of destination for 
Spanish automobile exports are European countries so, if European demand contracts as 
a result of the tariffs, Spanish exports to this countries would also be reduced. Global 
chain value plays an important role in this sector as production is highly fragmented.  
According to an economic report (Bank of Spain, 2019), the weight of the national 
value added is lower (48%) in comparison to the German one (70%). This means that 
Spain is more dependent on the value added generated in other countries. In line with the 
report of the Bank of Spain, a 10% fall in the German demand would have an impact of -
0.5 percentage points although the impact on the Spanish economy would be lower as the 
German automobile sector does not import a significant volume of components from 
Spain. However, in the case of a 10% decrease in the Spanish demand, the impact would 
be lower than in the case of Germany, it would only reduce value added by 0.15 pp. 
Hence, the Spanish economy would not experience an elevated impact in case 
these tariffs were implemented although the majority of the impact would be caused by 
the dependence with Germany, the UK and Italy. 
 
3.5. OTHER IMPACTS BEYOND: FINANCIAL MARKETS. 
The trade war between the two economic giants, China and the United States, has 
originated great uncertainty which has been transferred to financial markets through high 
volatility. 
As stated in the Global Financial Stability Report (October, 2019) elaborated by 
the International Monetary Fund, financial markets have been hit by the ongoing trade 
conflicts and by the increasing uncertainty regarding economic growth prospects. 
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According to such report, the mentioned events have directed monetary policy towards 
an accommodative position which has been accompanied by a low yield trend.  
On the one hand, it is said that currency wars go behind trade wars. Nowadays, 
countries aim at having weaker currencies in order to be more competitive.   
In the dispute between China and the U.S., currencies have played an important 
role, especially in the case of China. China was accused in August of 2019 of being a 
currency manipulator by the United States. China devalued the Chinese Yuan (CHY) a 
few days after the U.S. announcement of tariffs to China. By devaluing the currency, 
China was able to face the prices increase of Chinese exports to the U.S as a result of the 
new tariffs.  This way, Chinese products were cheaper and the effects of the tariffs were 
counteracted. 
Nevertheless, the yuan devaluation is also consistent with the Chinese efforts 
towards a market-oriented economy. 
Besides that, the yuan devaluation generates uncertainty and volatility, making 
investors go to more stable markets, such as the U.S. one. This implies an appreciation of 
the dollar, which is the opposite of what Donald Trump wanted.   
On the other hand, stock markets have also experienced the effects of the trade 
war. The American Index, Dow Jones Industrial Average, fell by 2.93% on 23rd of March 
of 2018 with the Trump’s signature of the tariffs on steel and aluminium imports while 
de Stock Index of Shanghai decreased by 3.39%.  The impact on the U.S. stock indexes 
has been lower than the one on the Chinese stock markets as the North-American indexes 
have proved to be more stable.  
The Spanish Stock Exchange market has also been affected by the instability and 
uncertainty of the trade war. The following graph (graph 3.5.1.) shows the evolution of 
the IBEX 35 over the past five years in which the effects of the trade war are reflected. 
This way, drops can be observed in those dates at which the trade war began (March 
2018) and the successive tariffs announcements made by the United States. The IBEX 35 
decreased by 0.99% on the 23rd of March while the European Stock Exchange Index, 
Euro Stoxx 50, dropped by 1.50%. The impact on the Spanish Stock Market was more 




Graph 3.5.1. Evolution of IBEX 35 (2015-2020). 
 
Source: Bolsa de Madrid 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS. 
Trade war between China and the United States is an economic conflict that affects 
not only these two economic giants but also the rest of the world, as already explained. 
Understanding its origin and the measures taken is key to quantify the impact on the rest 
of economies, including the European Union and Spain.  
The relevance of this analysis lies on the high dependence of the European Union 
and Spain on foreign trade and how conflicts of this kind significantly impact on 
international economies. 
The trade war between the United States and China originated as a result of the 
protectionist measures taken by the Trump Administration. Trump’s main objective for 
his term of office was to “make America great again”, thus, the deficit in the trade balance 
with China was an obstacle. Based on national security grounds, the U.S. Government 
initiated the conflict with China and many other countries in 2018, by implementing 
tariffs on steel and aluminium imports. From that moment onwards, successive rounds of 
tariffs and countermeasures from China took place. The EU got involved in the conflict 
when the protectionist measures targeted this economic bloc. 
At the beginning of this paper some objectives were set. The main one was to give 
an answer to the question of how the trade war between China and the United States 
impacts on the European Union and Spain and, after this analysis in depth, it can be 
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concluded that this objective has been accomplished. Consistency and veracity were 
another two key aspects in the development of this study, which are also accomplished as 
all data has been obtained from official databases such as Eurostat, ICEX and World 
Bank. 
Several conclusions are drawn from this analysis. The first one, is the high 
dependence of the European countries on foreign trade. Extra EU-28 exports accounted 
for 44.8% of its GDP in 2019, which explains why global trade tensions undermine the 
trade and stability of the European Union. In addition, in the case of Spain, exports 
accounted for 34.9% of the Spanish GDP in 2019. However, it is important to highlight 
that Spain is highly dependent on the European Union, as its member countries are the 
main place of destination for its exports and consequently, impacts on the rest of European 
countries affects the Spanish foreign trade. 
Focusing on the trade with the United States, the EU is more dependent of the 
United States trade in comparison to Spain,  as EU exports to the U.S. represented the 
22% of total EU exports in 2019 while Spanish exports to the U.S. only accounted for 
4.74% in that same year. 
The overall effect of the trade war between China and the United States on the 
European Union has been marginal due to the low importance of steel and aluminium 
exports (2.76%) over the total volume of exports. Its direct impact on Spain has not been 
significant either for the same reason. However, the steel and aluminium business 
associations were more concerned of the indirect impact because a higher supply from 
third countries redirected to the European market would result in lower prices.  
On the contrary, the EU has been benefited from the conflict, as it has been able 
to capture $90 billion of trade related to value chains. The most damaged have been 
North-American and Asian suppliers and not the EU owing to its insignificant 
contribution to the value chain.  
Nevertheless, the consequences of the WTO resolution due to the Airbus-Boeing 
dispute have been more significant for the European and Spanish economy. The 6,900 
million euros that the United States was allowed to implement as a result of the mentioned 
resolution, targeted European large civil aircraft and a wide variety of European products, 
mainly food products. For the specific case of Spain, these tariffs targeted strategic 
products for the Spanish export companies. The agro-food sector was the most damaged 
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one as exports of these products represented the 15.52% over total exports in 2019 and a 
3.55% of agro-food exports to the U.S over total agro-food exports. 
The most affected companies are those that focus their main economic activity on 
the export olive oil, olives and alcoholic drinks (wine mostly) as a consequence of their 
weight over total agro-food exports to the U.S. Hence, olive oil and olives represented 
the 32.49% over total agro-food exports to the U.S., while wine and other alcoholic drinks 
accounted for 18.43% over total agro-food exports to U.S. in 2019, too. 
Another reason why this is the most damaged sector as a result of the tariffs 
implemented by the U.S. is the price reduction that producers and companies were obliged 
to do in order to mitigate the rise in prices due to the duties. In addition, ASOLIVA has 
shown concerned about the implementation of these tariffs, since they can imply the U.S. 
demand elimination of these products, significantly damaging the profit of these 
companies. 
Regarding the automobile sector, it can be concluded that in case tariffs are 
implemented on automobile imports, the consequences would be more notorious than in 
the case of the steel and aluminium imports. It is worth stressing that the impact will be 
worse for the European Union than for the Spanish sector, as Extra EU-28 automobile 
exports to the U.S. represented the 30.15% over total Extra EU-28 automobile exports, 
while Spanish automobile exports to this same country accounted for 2.59% of total 
automobile exports in 2019. The effects on this sector will also be more detrimental to 
the EU as a result of the high fragmentation of the production chain.  
Furthermore, exports and imports have not been the only aspects affected by the 
tensions. Financial markets all over the world have experienced the side effects of these 
economic conflicts. Stock markets reported drastic price falls due to the protectionist 
measures taken by the U.S. governments and by the Chinese countermeasures. The 
uncertainty caused by this situation resulted in a higher volatility in the financial markets 
and in the lack of confidence of investors. With the EU as new target of the conflict, the 
side effects exacerbated. It is noteworthy, the role that currencies play in a commercial 
war, with the example of the Chinese Yuan devaluation. Numerous articles relate the 




Therefore, the great impact that the trade disputes between the two world giants 
originate on third economies has been corroborated. Given the difficulty of isolating the 
effect owing to the strong interconnection among the different economies and the brief 
time horizon of the dissertation, due to the current topic, further arguments and analysis 
perspective to the real consequences of the trade war will be provided over time. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, this paper also has several limitations. 
It is of great complexity to isolate the specific effects of the trade war due to the 
interconnection between world economies and the existence of other events and factors 
that influence on trade.  Thus, the economic slowdown and export reduction might be 
also due to the Brexit and many other factor affecting each economy. 
Besides, some of the consequences of these tariffs, like the ones resulting from 
the WTO resolution cannot be measured yet since the scope of this analysis reaches until 
2019 and these duties came into effect this same year. 
Furthermore, those headlines that grabbed week after week, month after month 
the pages of all international conjuncture reports and newspapers have given rise to the 
unexpected irruption and expansion of the COVID-19. The pandemic is challenging the 
management of all governments and taking them to their limits in the effort of obtaining 
the equipment and resources required. This health crisis will trigger a deep economic 
downturn, as it can be verified through the projections of the IMF (WEO, June 2020), 
that has estimated a contraction of the world economic growth of 4.9%, a decrease of 
10.2% in the Euro zone and a reduction of 12.8% for Spain. The recovery will depend on 
the evolution of the pandemic and the development of the different trade conflicts, like 
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Appendix I. Companies affected by the trade war. Case of Google and Huawei.  
Several companies have been directly affected by the trade war between the 
world’s two economic giants, as it has been the case of the Chinese tech-company Huawei 
and the American company Google.  
Huawei was directly involved in the conflict due to its alliance with the Chinese 
government in which Huawei would significantly help China become an economic giant 
while the Chinese government would protect the tech-company from foreign competition. 
In addition, Huawei agreed to share information with the government.  
The Chinese government only allowed foreign enterprises enter the Chinese 
market if these companies allied with local companies (for example, through joint 
ventures). This way, Chinese companies were able to acquire intellectual property and 
know-how from its foreign partners and eventually, end or break the contracts signed.  
All of the mentioned facts plus the obligation of Chinese companies to share information 
with the government in spite of being private enterprises, were the reasons why the United 
States formally accused China of intellectual property theft and later, claimed that 
Chinese enterprises were a threat to the National Security of the country. 
Until that moment, Huawei had been protected by the Chinese government, but 
from the beginning of the trade war in March 2018, the company got involved in the 
middle of the conflict due to that same alliance that had protected the corporation in the 
previous years. 
In December 2018, the conflict exacerbated when Meng Wanzhou, Chief 
Financial Officer of Huawei, was arrested in Canada at the request of the U.S. 
Government. Both Huawei and its CFO were charged with bank fraud, wire fraud, and 
conspiracies to commit bank and wire fraud. Moreover, as stated by Secretary Nielsen, 
they violated the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Later, in January, the 
FBI announced twenty-three charges against Huawei and its CFO. 
In March 2019, Meng Wanzhou sued the Canadian government for her arrest 
alleging a violation of her constitutional rights.  
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Some months later, the U.S. included Huawei in its Entity List, which banned U.S. 
companies from selling to Huawei due to Homeland Security issues. As response, the 
Chinese company filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Government.  
This ban implied that Huawei devices would no longer have Android, Gmail and  
Play Store, among other apps provided by the U.S. company Google. In addition, Huawei 
consumers could not update their Android versions, exposing their devices to a security 
breach. 
Few months after the ban, Huawei foreign sales fell by 40%. However, not only 
Huawei was affected by the prohibition, but also American companies like Google, 
Nvidia, and Microsoft as they could not provide their services to the Chinese company.  
After the G20 Summit in June, Trump lifted the ban on Huawei and agreed not to 
levy new tariffs. 






















Appendix III. Share of EU-28 imports of goods for main partners (2004-2017). 
 
Source: Eurostat
U.S. CHINA SWITZERLAND NORWAY TURKEY JAPAN RUSSIA
2004 24,90 5,10 8,00 3,30 4,30 4,60 4,90
2005 23,90 4,90 8,20 3,20 4,30 4,20 5,40
2006 23,20 5,50 7,70 3,30 4,30 3,90 6,30
2007 21,00 5,80 7,60 3,50 4,30 3,50 7,20
2008 18,90 6,00 7,70 3,30 4,20 3,20 8,00
2009 18,70 7,50 8,10 3,40 4,10 3,30 6,00
2010 18,00 8,40 8,20 3,10 4,60 3,20 6,40
2011 17,00 8,80 9,10 3,00 4,70 3,20 7,00
2012 17,40 8,60 7,90 3,00 4,50 3,30 7,30
2013 16,70 8,50 9,70 2,90 4,50 3,10 6,90
2014 18,30 9,70 8,20 2,90 4,40 3,10 6,10
2015 20,70 9,50 8,40 2,70 4,40 3,20 4,10
2016 20,80 9,70 8,10 2,80 4,50 3,30 4,10
2017 20,00 10,50 8,00 2,70 4,50 3,20 4,60
In percentage
U.S. CHINA SWITZERLAND NORWAY TURKEY JAPAN RUSSIA
2004 15,50 12,60 6,10 5,40 3,20 7,30 8,30
2005 13,40 13,60 5,60 5,70 3,10 6,30 9,60
2006 12,50 14,30 5,20 6,00 3,10 5,70 10,50
2007 12,30 16,10 5,30 5,50 3,30 5,50 10,20
2008 11,50 15,70 5,20 6,10 2,90 4,80 11,40
2009 12,60 17,40 6,50 5,60 2,90 4,70 9,70
2010 11,40 18,50 5,60 5,20 2,80 4,40 10,60
2011 11,20 17,00 5,40 5,50 2,80 4,10 11,60
2012 11,60 16,20 5,90 5,60 2,70 3,60 12,00
2013 11,80 16,60 5,60 5,30 3,00 3,40 12,30
2014 12,40 17,90 5,70 5,00 3,20 3,30 10,80
2015 14,40 20,30 5,90 4,30 3,60 3,50 7,90
2016 14,60 20,60 7,10 3,70 3,90 3,90 7,00











Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance
2004 235.726,5 159.312,9 76.413,6 48.382,0 129.202,7 -80.820,7 75.268,4 62.166,2 13.102,2 30.785,6 55.341,5 -24.555,9
2005 250.864,3 158.821,3 92.043,0 51.748,9 161.007,7 -109.258,8 86.284,8 66.696,8 19.588,0 33.746,3 67.198,9 -33.452,6
2006 267.012,3 170.869,2 96.143,1 63.695,6 195.816,2 -132.120,6 88.592,2 71.619,7 16.972,5 38.380,0 81.921,9 -43.541,9
2007 259.608,1 177.963,3 81.644,8 71.823,3 233.862,9 -162.039,6 93.234,1 77.047,0 16.187,1 43.470,5 79.294,9 -35.824,4
2008 248.041,9 182.959,8 65.082,1 78.300,5 249.102,0 -170.801,5 100.622,4 82.649,9 17.972,5 43.719,0 95.944,7 -52.225,7
2009 204.170,9 156.077,5 48.093,4 82.421,0 215.274,1 -132.853,1 88.795,7 80.908,8 7.886,9 37.490,2 68.918,3 -31.428,1
2010 243.301,5 174.654,6 68.646,9 113.452,3 283.355,0 -169.902,7 110.469,2 85.492,9 24.976,3 41.933,3 79.026,0 -37.092,7
2011 264.217,8 194.221,9 69.995,9 136.414,3 294.745,8 -158.331,5 142.066,0 93.497,7 48.568,3 46.818,5 95.661,8 -48.843,3
2012 293.564,0 209.381,8 84.182,2 144.227,8 292.002,6 -147.774,8 133.619,1 105.889,1 27.730,0 49.930,2 100.273,6 -50.343,4
2013 289.440,4 199.471,2 89.969,2 148.115,2 279.913,4 -131.798,2 169.137,8 94.532,2 74.605,6 50.079,4 89.917,9 -39.838,5
2014 311.324,0 209.263,1 102.060,9 164.680,8 302.293,0 -137.612,2 140.284,9 96.493,1 43.791,8 50.198,6 85.003,4 -34.804,8
2015 371.203,3 249.275,8 121.927,5 170.359,6 351.072,4 -180.712,8 150.512,7 102.355,4 48.157,3 48.781,7 74.342,0 -25.560,3
2016 363.593,6 248.754,4 114.839,2 169.698,2 352.168,1 -182.469,9 142.215,6 121.371,2 20.844,4 48.318,9 63.516,7 -15.197,8
2017 376.166,9 257.265,6 118.901,3 197.620,5 375.278,5 -177.658,0 149.843,0 110.727,5 39.115,5 50.643,5 73.775,2 -23.131,7
2018 406.599,0 268.715,8 195.272,7 211.326,3 395.167,4 -183.841,1 156.267,3 108.970,7 47.296,6 53.875,8 82.829,1 -28.953,3
2019 449.579,2 293.922,4 224.399,2 225.180,0 419.812,0 -194.632,0 160.581,7 132.630,1 27.951,6 55.747,5 71.865,6 -16.118,1
U.S. CHINA








Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance
2004 40.185,2 32.862,7 7.322,5 43.468,9 74.920,3 -31.451,4 46.122,7 84.920,9 -38.798,2
2005 44.620,3 36.229,8 8.390,5 43.723,2 74.345,9 -30.622,7 56.690,3 114.029,9 -57.339,6
2006 50.017,2 41.927,3 8.089,9 44.753,4 78.430,3 -33.676,9 72.398,6 143.601,5 -71.202,9
2007 52.829,5 47.378,4 5.451,1 43.741,7 79.259,2 -35.517,5 89.196,1 147.733,8 -58.537,7
2008 54.476,1 46.288,3 8.187,8 42.390,4 76.474,5 -34.084,1 104.968,0 180.446,2 -75.478,2
2009 44.485,8 36.445,8 8.040,0 35.977,7 58.440,1 -22.462,4 65.696,7 119.570,1 -53.873,4
2010 61.879,7 43.065,8 18.813,9 43.984,0 67.046,5 -23.062,5 86.328,0 162.120,7 -75.792,7
2011 73.336,1 48.816,7 24.519,4 49.075,4 70.450,7 -21.375,3 108.559,4 201.433,9 -92.874,5
2012 75.491,2 48.823,9 26.667,3 55.663,1 64.998,6 -9.335,5 123.506,0 215.118,2 -91.612,2
2013 77.623,6 50.657,5 26.966,1 54.015,7 56.611,3 -2.595,6 119.468,4 207.014,8 -87.546,4
2014 74.756,5 54.408,6 20.347,9 53.322,2 56.466,8 -3.144,6 103.281,7 182.164,0 -78.882,3
2015 78.964,1 61.637,0 17.327,1 56.537,6 59.690,3 -3.152,7 73.786,2 136.441,8 -62.655,6
2016 77.917,3 66.592,3 11.325,0 58.044,6 65.861,8 -7.817,2 72.368,5 118.961,7 -46.593,2
2017 84.794,8 69.775,6 15.019,2 60.546,4 68.472,2 -7.925,8 85.991,3 144.684,3 -58.693,0
2018 77.151,7 76.136,9 1.014,8 64.779,4 69.922,0 -5.142,6 85.103,4 168.919,3 -83.815,9
2019 74.025,1 80.102,4 -6.077,3 68.527,1 73.686,7 -5.159,6 90.786,4 157.345,9 -66.559,5




Appendix VI. Spanish Trade Balance (2015-2019). 
 
 
























EXPORTS IMPORTS TRADE BALANCE
2015 249.794.415,65 274.772.330,22 -24.977.914,57
2016 256.393.380,08 273.778.599,40 -17.385.219,32
2017 276.142.906,54 302.431.158,46 -26.288.251,92
2018 285.260.541,30 319.647.329,61 -34.386.788,32
2019 290.089.074,08 322.068.688,11 -31.979.614,03
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Appendix VIII. Spanish automobile exports to the main countries of destination. 
 























2017 1.367.574,19 10.748.641,36 4.814.807,65 5.594.850,01 55.368.508,06
2018 1.272.678,79 10.547.574,83 4.696.141,86 5.389.133,77 56.078.449,53
2019 1.443.050,47 10.991.797,00 4.727.017,45 5.752.805,63 55.645.734,64
(in thousand euros)
